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Philosophy 252/History of Modern Philosophy 
Professor Deborah Slicer 
E-mail: ds7p@selway.umt.edu 
LA148 
Phone: 243-2527 
Office Hours: TBA 
Philosophy 252 covers philosophical figures and movements from roughly the 
16th century through the 18th century. We give special attention to debates in metaphysics 
and epistemology and somewhat less attention to politics, ethics, and religion. I have 
three primary goals in this course. First, I want to provide you with an historical context 
for the philosophical debates that characterize the modem period. Second, I want you to 
appreciate how the modem period significantly shaped the contemporary Euro-American 
worldview. And, third, you will learn to closely read and to thoughtfully critique 
philosophical arguments. 
Please be advised of the following: (1) I don't accept late papers, unless attached 
to a doctor's excuse. (2) I consider group efforts plagiarism, unless I've specified the 
project a group one, e.g., the presentation debate. Please see me if you have any questions 
about plagiarism. (3) Class starts at 3:40 and ends at 5:00. Please come on time and don't 
leave early, unless you've notified me of some special need. Thanks. Let's be considerate 
of each other. 
Text: 
Modern Philosophy, ed. Roger Ariew & Eric Watkins 
(x)--Xerox. Hard copies and ERes in library 
Assignments: 
1127 Hello, business, introductory remarks 

1129 Socio-historical context of the modem period: Modem Philosophy (MP), 

General Introduction, Vespucci (x), Luther (x), Erasmus (x) 
2/3 Montaigne (x) 
2/5-2/19 Descartes, Meditations 
2124 Descartes debate 
2/26 Spinoza, Theologica-Political Treatise (x) 
3/3-3/5 Spinoza, Ethics, Part 1 
3/10 Spinoza Debate 
3/12 Mid-term exam 
3/17-3/31 Essay, Locke 
412 Locke debate 
417-419 Principles ofHuman Knowledge, Berkeley 
4/14-4/21 Inquiry, Hume 
4123 Hume debate 
4128 2"d exam 
4130-517 Prolegomena, Kant 
5/12 Final Exam, 3:20-5:20 
Requirements: 
Exam I: 25% 
Exam II: 25% 
Final: 25% 
Debate: 10% 
Summaries: 15% 
Debate Presentation 
Each student must participate in a debate presentation once. 
Groups of 6-7 students will be responsible for debating a figure in 
front of the class. One group of 3 or so will defend the figure, 
while another group of 3 or so will ~sk 3 questions of the figure. 
One of those questions must be posed from the perspective of a 
figure we have already read. E.g. , you might have Hume ask Kant a 
question or Locke question Descartes. A second question should be 
stated as the group's objection to some specific, but central, 
point the philosopher makes. I'll leave the nature of the third 
question to· the group's discretion. Each question should be 
written up in a minimum of 3 good sized paragraphs. That is, you 
should develop each question into a mini-paper, referring to 
specifics in the texts and giving us some solid sense of why you 
are asking the question. The challengers must distribute xeroxed 
copies of their questions to all students on the class before the 
scheduled debate. This way everyone will have prior opportunity to 
research and respond to these quest~ons. I'll provide you with 
sample questions soon . 
. Nondebaters will prepare . their o~ three questions an~ bring 
those to class on the day of the debate. ·You don't need copies for 
everyone, but you will turn your question~ in to .me on the day of 
the debate. ' · " . 
The formal debate will take place during ~he first so minutes 
of class. During the last 30 minutes nondebaters will ask their 
own questions of the group representing the figure on the hot seat. 
. 
. . ­
Please be advised: those who don't follow these instructions 
will be docked 1/2 a letter grade. · So, see me if you have any
questions about this procedure. · · · · 
And feel free to run questions by me prior to these debates. 
\ 

Sample Debate Questions 
Montaigne's •The Apology for Raimond Sebond" 
1. } [Response from a prior philosopher] Galileo was no skeptic. · He 
asserts that God provided us with senses, reason, and intellect so 
that · we can decipher the meaning of the· universe, God's divine 
creation. He acknowledges that divine wisdom far surpasses human 
knowledge, but, he says, "I do not feel obliged to believe that 
that same God who has endowed tis with senses, reason, intellect has 
intended to forgo their use .and by some other means to give us 
knowledge which we can attain by them" {p. 63}. Indeed, he argues, 
"Philosophy is written in this grand book, ·the universe, which 
stands continually open to our gaze. But the book cannot be 
understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language. . . It 
is written in the language of mathematics ... {p. 65}. 
In addition to mathematical truths, which are apparently
accessible to us, we can have knowledge of other first principles. 
For example, we can safely say that the whole is greater than its 
parts. Why would God give us the various powers of reason if not 
to discover such truths and deduce further truths from these? 
Montaigne suggests that the creator endowed us with reason so that 
we could argue ourselves into a stupor, become empty vessels, 
"blank slates, " at which time God, in His grace, would fil.l us up
with truth. Why would God give us such a round-about means of 
finding truth? Such a God would seem Tll?llevolent and frivolous, not 
the Christian God. 
Besides, to challenge our rationality, the way Montaigne
challenges and trivialize~ it, is to destroy our humanity, to turn 
us into beasts. Surely, we, human beings, are closer to the truth, 
and to God, than the ox or Montaigne's cat. Scripture clearly says 
this is the case. Montaigne's attempts to equate humanity with the 
lower animals {p . . 71) defies commonsense and may even be 
blasphemous. . 
2.} [Objection] Montaigne argues that because all is in doubt, we 
ought to accept Christianity on faith alone . . For example, he says 
that "Our faith is not of our own acquiring. It is a pure present
of another's liberality. It is not by reasoning or by our 
understanding that we have received religion; it is by external 
authority and command" {p. 72). And he cites Corinthians to 
buttress his case. Once it sinks in that religion is a matter of 
faith and not understanding, that we couldn't possibly understand 
something as awesome as the divine, we humbly open ourselves to 
divine grace, to His gift of knowledge. 
Montaigne's argument is a non sequitur. Just because all is 
doubt, doesn't mean that we must (a} accept Christianity on faith, 
or {b) accept Christianity at all . With regard to (a}, all may 
wetl be in doubt, but we may still seek and offer compelling 
... ~:r..··~ :. ..~;. •, . ..._..,l.;.;..;:..__•-....,· 
reasons on behalf of Christianity. We can do so as good P.yrrhonic 
skeptics, in fact, as Christians who acknowledge doubt, the 
uncertainty, of the reasons we offer. ' 
And, regarding (b), if all is doubt, then so . is Christianity. 
Why not accept Judaism, or some variety of paganism, or better yet., 
become an agnostic? Montaigne is addressing the Reformists, among 
others here. But why not embrace Calvinism? Why throw your lot in 
with the Catholic papacy, if there are no criteria for deciding 
veracity of any sort, theological, scientific, or political? (See
Montaigne's discussion of criteria on p. 80-81.) 
3 . ) [Open Question) Montaigne says that Pyrrhonian skeptics cannot 
adequately express their . brand of ·skepticism in any language
available to them. ·This is because all languages rely solely.on 
affirnia.tive propositions: "I have two heads," or "I do not have two 
heads , " or, even, "I don' t know if I have one or two heads . " Each 
of these statements ass~rts something is true, is certain. The 
Pyrrhonian skeptic, unlike more dogmatic skeptic~, want to avoid 
assertions of any sort of truth. They don't even want to assert 
the truth of Pyrrhonian skepticism, as that would contradict their 
view that nothing, not even their own view, is ce~tain. 
Is this a tenable position? If one can~t articulate it, how 
can any . of us fully understand it, much less practice it? 
Montaigne uses two analogies in order to better articulate the 
Pyrrhonistic position. First, he takes an analogy from medicine 
(p. 73), involving rhubarb. What, exactly, does this analogy mean 
and how is it directly relevant to his position? 
Second, he uses a pair of scales as an analogy. Above the 
scales, he says, are inscribed the Pyrrhonist's motto, a question, 
not an assertion, "What do I know?" {pg. 73) What does this 
analogy mean, and how is it relevant to Pyrrhonism? 
